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18	UNITED STATES	DISTRICT COURT		
19		ICT OF CALIFORNIA		
	SAN FRANCI	ISCO DIVISION		
20				
21	WAYMO LLC,	Case No. 3:17-cv-00939-WHA		
22	Plaintiff,	UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. AND OTTOMOTTO LLC'S OPPOSITION TO		
23	V.	WAYMO'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL DATE		
24	UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., OTTOMOTTO LLC; OTTO TRUCKING	The Honorable William Alsup		
25	LLC,			
26	Defendants.	Trial Date: October 10, 2017		
27	REDACTED VERSION OF DOCI	JMENT SOUGHT TO BE SEALED		
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### I. INTRODUCTION

After claiming for months that it has irrefutable evidence of patent infringement and trade secret theft by Uber, Waymo's case has come to a screeching halt. All four patent claims have been dismissed. Its trade secrets claim has been narrowed to a handful of minor features in one LiDAR component. And the heart of Waymo's case—that Anthony Levandowski supposedly sat at a computer and selected 14,000 important proprietary files to be downloaded—has collapsed like a house of cards. After discovery closed, Waymo finally—and only in response to a court order—produced documents stating that the 14,000 files are actually of "low value" and were someone logged on to that repository. That critical information had never previously been disclosed to Uber, or to this Court.

Waymo's motion for a continuance asks this Court for a do-over after it knowingly made the informed decision in June 2017 to proceed with expedited discovery and a trial in October 2017 despite not having the Stroz report. In its Motion claiming it now wants to change strategy and delay this trial, Waymo fails to point out that the (Dkt. 1603-4 at 2:17) in the Stroz report is evidence that Until Waymo filed its complaint, no one with access to the Stroz Report could have discerned that a reference to Mr. Levandowski was evidence that Mr. Levandowski had wrongfully taken those files (or somehow retained them). Having worked at Google for over eight years, it is not surprising that Mr. Levandowski would have had Similarly, it is not surprising that especially since Uber made clear that it did not want any Google information brought to Uber.

And the facts show that the due diligence worked. Waymo has conducted a dozen inspections of Uber's LiDAR device, source code, work stations, computers, and facilities, taken over 50 days of depositions, and has found no evidence that the 14,000 files or any other Google

files ever made it to Uber. That explains why Waymo is in no hurry to try this case, after requesting and getting expedited discovery and an expedited trial date.

Waymo now seeks to delay the trial, even though this Court has made it clear that Waymo may not get a trial date for two years. Waymo claims that it needs a continuance because there are a lot of materials at Stroz. But the question for the jury is what, if anything, did *Uber* misappropriate. That only helps Uber—which explains why Waymo walked away from a dozen inspections at Uber empty-handed.

Waymo's motion for continuance is motivated—at least in part—by the realization that
Waymo's damages expert failed miserably in his effort to concoct a theory to support Waymo's
inflated damages claim. As the Court knows, none of the parties have

Nevertheless, Waymo's damages are based entirely
on speculative future profits and cost savings in a nascent market, and Waymo's expert relied on
a document that is 18 months old and untested. Furthermore, Waymo failed to conduct any
causation analysis to show that the purported unjust future profits were caused by
misappropriation of each trade secret.

Waymo should not be allowed to use a continuance as a vehicle for attempting to repair these fatal flaws. Instead, as described below, the Court should either deny the motion for continuance or, at most, hold a short bench trial in October on the narrowed list of trade secrets and grant a continuance with regard to any others. If the Court entertains such a limited continuance, Uber believes that it would be helpful to the Court and to the jurors for there to be input from a court-appointed neutral expert.

# II. THE STROZ REPORT CONFIRMS THAT THE DUE DILIGENCE PREVENTED ANY GOOGLE FILES FROM REACHING UBER

While replete with inflammatory rhetoric, glaringly absent from Waymo's description of the diligence that Stroz performed is the irrefutable conclusion that it worked: none of the after working at Google for several years made its way to Uber or Ottomotto. There is also not a shred of evidence that Uber knew of or

1	"); <i>id.</i> Exs. 3-7 (diligenced employee attestations:
2	), tal 2.15 e / (a.11golioca chipio) co altecatalistic
3	).)
4	Uber and Stroz required Levandowski and the other diligenced employees to
5	, and
6	Levandowski attested that he did so. Then,
7	Levandowski attested that he did so. Then,
8	Thus, there was no way for him for
9	the remainder of his time at Otto or once he joined Uber. (Dkt. 1603-6, Ex. 17 to Stroz Rpt. at 2.)
10	
11	(Dkt. 1603-5, Stroz Rpt. at 12-13.) This is the exact scenario the Court
12	recognized as "an innocent explanation." (5/3 Public Hr'g Tr. at 108:14-25 (The Court: "But
13	let's say for some reason they did the deal, joint defense, and under that scenario Uber would be
14	saying: We are innocent. We don't know we don't want any of those trade secrets. We just
15	want Levandowski. He's brilliant. He's the man in the Smithsonian with the motorcycle. We
16	just want him. We don't want his documents. So go put those documents in a vault. Never look
17	at them. Promise us you're never going to inspect them. Small chance, but some chance that that
18	happened. So what do we do? What does the system of justice do in a case like this, where
19	there's an innocent explanation; there's a guilty explanation; neither of them have been proven up
20	yet.").)
21	With respect to the 14,000 files, Waymo ignores that the Stroz Report confirms that those
22	files could not have come to Uber because Levandowski
23	
24	. (Dkt. 1603-5, Stroz Rpt. at 12.) Until Waymo filed its complaint, no one with
25	access to the Stroz Report could have discerned that a reference to Levandowski
26	was evidence that Levandowski had wrongfully taken those
27	files. Likewise, that Waymo alleges
28	Levandowski


1	are not "irrefutable evidence that these two trade secrets			
2	were directly communicated to Uber." (Mot. at 17.) To the contrary, they were not			
3	communicated to Uber at all, much less directly or irrefutably, for			
4	and no one at Uber ever received access to these			
5	. (Dkt. 823 at 6.)			
6	Waymo's assertion that "Uber knew about and encouraged the destruction of evidence" is			
7	baseless and supported by nothing in the Report, including Waymo's selective quotation of the			
8	underlying deposition testimony and of the Report. Contrary to Waymo's assertions (Mot. at 2,			
9	8-9), Messrs. Kalanick's and Poetzscher's deposition testimony on this topic is completely			
10	consistent with the Report and shows they directed Levandowski not to bring any Google			
11	information into Uber. When Levandowski disclosed his possession of five disks containing			
12	Google information, the Report says			
13				
14	" (Dkt. 1603-5,			
15	Stroz Rpt. at 10.) Waymo's motion selectively omitted the first part of Mr. Kalanick's instruction			
16	to Levandowski during that meeting. Waymo also incorrectly claims that Rhian Morgan			
17	"testified at her deposition that she had no involvement in and never even heard of the Stroz			
18	investigation." (Mot. at 9 (citing April deposition).) In an intervening portion of her April			
19	deposition that Waymo omits, Ms. Morgan stated (amidst objections) that she did "remember			
20	there being some interviews that happened for some of our early employees. I'm not sure if that			
21	counts under due diligence – or not." (Gonzalez Decl. Ex. 8, 4/14/17 Morgan Dep. 17:8-17.) In			
22	an additional deposition, she stated that Levandowski and others were being interviewed by a			
23	forensic investigation firm, and that she was responsible for filing documents relating to the			
24	investigation, but had no further substantive knowledge of the process. (Gonzalez Decl. Ex. 9,			
25	8/18/17 Morgan Dep. at 143:2-14, 147:2-148:5.)			
26	Having worked at Google for over seven years, it is not surprising that Levandowski			
27	would have			
28	. (Dkt. 1603-5, Stroz Rpt. at 12.) Using a			

personal device for work purposes is not evidence of theft; indeed, Waymo's policies expressly

(Gonzalez Decl. Ex. 10 (Waymo personal device policy).) Similarly, it is not surprising that

, especially since Uber made it clear throughout the deal negotiations that it did not want any Google information brought to Uber.

In sum, and contrary to Waymo's misleading claims, the Stroz Report confirms that no Google material came into Uber. Contrary to Waymo's misleading arguments, the Report:



## III. UBER DID NOTHING IMPROPER WITH RESPECT TO THE STROZ REPORT

The parties to the Stroz Report legitimately believed that a common interest privilege applied. Uber could not decide unilaterally to waive that privilege. After this Court decided that the common interest privilege did not exist until the term sheet was signed, Uber did not appeal this Court's decision to the Federal Circuit; Mr. Levandowski did.

Once the Federal Circuit issued its decision, Uber promptly produced the Stroz Report and its exhibits within hours. (Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 3.) Uber produced its Stroz-related documents the next day. (Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 4.) MoFo also made the from the Stroz database that are in

its files—which MoFo received on behalf of Mr. Levandowski *after* Google filed its arbitrations against him and are the only Stroz materials MoFo has other than the Stroz Report and its exhibits—available for review promptly.

Since the Federal Circuit's decision, Uber has provided deposition dates for five deponents. (Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 2.) Waymo has rejected these dates. (*Id.*) Uber understands that Stroz has provided a date for its deponents. Waymo has not responded to Stroz's proposal.

## IV. WAYMO IS SEEKING A CONTINUANCE SO IT CAN SHORE UP ITS SHAKY CASE

## A. All of Waymo's Patent Claims Have Been Dismissed

Waymo's patent claims were a complete misfire. Waymo's claims based on all four patents have been dismissed.

## B. Waymo's Nine Asserted Trade Secrets Are Weak

As the Court recognized at a recent hearing, this is

(9/6/17 Sealed Hr'g Tr. 106:9-11.) Waymo started the case by accusing Uber of copying

Waymo's entire single-lens LiDAR design, but is now reduced to asserting misappropriation of a handful of minor features in one LiDAR component—

Waymo's nine

remaining trade secret claims have numerous defects: the purported evidence of misappropriation is thin to non-existent, with only a very strained connection to the 14,000 files Waymo alleges

Levandowski wrongfully downloaded; the accused features in Uber's Fuji LiDAR were independently developed with no specific design input from Mr. Levandowski; and most of the claimed trade secrets are broad, generally-known concepts that are within the intellectual "toolbox" of LiDAR engineers.

The following is a brief summary of the state of play for each of Waymo's nine alleged trade secrets:

•	TS 96 (GBr3): This trade secret covers the specific	
	of Waymo's GBr3 LiDAR. As detailed in Uber's summary judgment moti	ion on
	TS 96 (Dkt. 1514), Waymo's technical expert, Dr. Hesselink, confirms that Uber do	oes not
	use the specific implementation of GBr3. The	do not

1	match, even when the differing focal lengths are (improperly) factored out. (Dkt. 1512-4
2	at 3-6.) Further, Dr. Hesselink acknowledges that the
3	
4	
5	• TS 9 ( ): This broadly-defined trade secret boils down to a fundamental optics
6	principle—i.e.,
7	explained in Uber's summary judgment motion on TS 9 (Dkt. 1419), Waymo concedes
8	that its own '922 patent discloses all elements of TS 9 except for
9	Yet, Waymo's engineers admitted that is a
10	well-known concept in optics. (Dkt. 1419-4 at 11-12.) Moreover, public literature
11	discloses , and the concept has been used in commercially-
12	available LiDARs for years (including Velodyne's HDL-64, used by both Google and
13	Uber in their self-driving vehicles). ( <i>Id.</i> at 13-15.)
14	• TS 2 ( transmit block): Waymo's misappropriation theory for TS 2 is that the
15	two separate transmit blocks in Uber's Fuji LiDAR are the same as the single
16	transmit block in GBr3, because . That simplistic notion ignores Fuji's
17	2-cavity LiDAR design (hence, its two transmit blocks), which is fundamentally different
18	than GBr3's single-cavity, single-lens design with a single block. Waymo has presented
19	no evidence that Uber embraced as a magic number; rather, Uber chose
20	to distribute the 32 diodes in each of Fuji's 2 cavities, because that configuration provided
21	enough physical space for mounting the diodes. Uber is currently
22	
23	• TS 7 ( ): Waymo initially claimed that having a laser diode
24	was a trade secret, but retreated when faced with the numerous public
25	disclosures of that concept. Now Waymo claims that a
26	secret. But internal Waymo emails and testimony show that was an arbitrary
27	number , and was not the result of any testing or lengthy
28	development. (See, e.g., Gonzalez Decl. Ex. 12 at WAYMO-UBER-00022197-198

1	(vendor writing in response to Waymo statement that "
2	
3	
4	").) It was
5	also shared with vendors apparently without any NDA. (See, e.g., Gonzalez Decl. Ex. 13
6	at WAYMO-UBER-00022246 (2/4/2016 Email to third-party), attaching, inter
7	alia, id. Ex. 14 at WAYMO-UBER-00022288 ("
8	"); see also Dkt. 923 at 1 (granting Uber motion to compel all vendors NDAs);
9	Gonzalez Decl. Ex. 15 (Email from Uber counsel stating that Uber had not located an
10	NDA for in Waymo's productions).) Uber has already
11	
12	• TS 13 ( ): Waymo claims that the general concept of using
13	
14	. Numerous vendor websites reveal, however,
15	that using is well known. Indeed,
16	vendors sell for this very purpose.
17	Moreover, Uber is currently
18	• TS 14 is the concept of having in PCBs to align the PCBs to
19	each other and to be used as reference points for
20	'922 patent discloses the in Waymo's LiDAR boards, and public references
21	disclose for aligning PCBs and used as reference points for
22	Moreover, Uber is currently from the boards.
23	• TS 90 : This alleged trade secret does not pertain to Fuji at all,
24	but only to Uber's abandoned Spider LiDAR design. Waymo asserts that
25	Mr. Levandowski disclosed Waymo's method to Uber engineer
26	James Haslim, who purportedly implemented that method in Spider. The evidence shows,
27	however, that Spider's method (and the rough sketch that Mr. Levandowski
28	provided) was a publicly-known technique. Mr. Haslim consulted public references to

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claim, Waymo did exactly that—Mr. Wagner's report purports to calculate future "unjust profits" for each of the nine asserted trade secrets that reach as high as . Mr. Wagner then uses those figures as the baseline royalty before arbitrarily applying a across the board increase under *Georgia Pacific*, resulting in total damages of for the alleged misappropriation of a single trade secret. On Saturday, Defendants filed a motion to exclude all of Mr. Wagner's opinions as speculative and not reliable. (Dkt. 1614-4.)

As explained in that motion, Mr. Wagner calculates those astronomical figures using a methodology that is not reliable, inserting variables that he neither derived nor tested, and making assumptions that no reasonable expert would make. For the future unjust profits analysis, he takes an 18-month old slide prepared by an Uber corporate development manager that was never used for any purpose, adopts it without testing it, and then opines that the nine discrete trade secrets relating to LiDAR hardware will allow Uber's entire autonomous vehicle ("AV") program to skip ahead in all aspects of development and commercialization. For saved development costs, Mr. Wagner assumes the discrete trade secrets will allow Uber to save the cash burn rate for Uber's entire AV unit for the amount of time that it would have taken Uber to independently develop each trade secret. And for his reasonable royalty opinion, Mr. Wagner uses his future unjust profits figures as the baseline royalty, and then applies an arbitrary across the board increase purportedly based on the Georgia Pacific factors, though the increase is neither calculated nor tied to any specific factor. Mr. Wagner's opinions do not come close to meeting causation and apportionment standards, and the assumptions on which they depend are wholly unreliable and untested.

#### V. THE COURT SHOULD PROCEED IN A MANNER THAT WILL RESOLVE THIS DISPUTE EFFICIENTLY WHILE HOLDING WAYMO TO ACCOUNT FOR ITS INFORMED CHOICE TO SEEK AN EXPEDITED TRIAL DATE.

The Court has three options in moving this case forward to a resolution. The first is to maintain the current trial date, recognizing that the expedited trial schedule was implemented at Waymo's request and it made an informed choice despite the risks to push forward at significant

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expense and time to the parties and the Court. The second—granting the continuance and permitting Waymo to bog the Court and the parties down with its bloated list of 121 trade secrets plus more to come and years of additional discovery—is the most unwieldy and inefficient. And after consuming tremendous public and private resources, the parties will find themselves back in this exact same position in one or two years—on the eve of trial with a brand-new list of proposed trade secrets to try. Lastly, if the Court strikes the plaintiff's speculative and unreliable damages model, it could try an equitable bench trial starting on October 10th. An equitable bench trial would resolve the plaintiff's best nine trade secrets quickly and serve as a bellwether to provide the parties information for resolving this dispute.

## A. Denying the Continuance

The best option for the Court is to deny the continuance and proceed to trial on the current schedule. The expedited trial schedule was imposed on the parties and the Court at Waymo's request, and the parties have invested considerable resources preparing for an October trial as a result of that request. Thousands of documents have been produced between the parties and 69 depositions have been taken, with 12 witnesses being deposed multiple times to date. Waymo understood the risks of pursuing an expedited October 2017 trial date, including the risks that it would need to narrow the issues for trial and that it might not obtain every conceivable piece of discovery it might want. The Court has addressed these risks at numerous points, such as on June 6, 2017 when discussing Waymo's meritless patent claims:

I want to give a lecture to Waymo. You're the plaintiff. You're the one that wants to get to trial. You're a big firm. You big firms always think you can hold on to every issue and have it both ways, but at some point you got to cut loose and decide, do you really think these patent claims are worth the salt. In my view, they're not.

(6/7/17 Hr'g Tr. 47:23-48:3.) If Waymo was concerned that the Court's suggestion to narrow the list of trade secrets would be deemed a waiver of the others, then it should have sought clarification from the Court and decided whether to continue on an expedited calendar or not.

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Instead, Waymo waited over two months after the case management order—and more than two weeks after narrowing its list of trade secrets—before seeking that clarification. And when told at the August 16 hearing that they would be waiving their other trade secrets if they pushed forward with the current trial date, Waymo continued to proceed for another month despite knowing it did not have the Stroz report. Waymo made a deliberate and informed choice in asking to proceed at breakneck speed, imposing a significant burden on the Court and the parties. Waymo's relentless push for an October trial date—knowing full well the consequences it may have and the burdens it placed on the parties and the Court—should have consequences. The Court has discretion to hold Waymo to their informed choice. Waymo should therefore be compelled to stick with the trial date it sought and waive any trade secret other than those currently scheduled to be tried.

#### В. **Granting the Continuance**

Granting a continuance without limiting Waymo on the number of trade secrets it can pursue is not a cost-effective or realistic option. At the start of this litigation, Waymo pursued claims on 121 alleged trade secrets. (Dkt. 25-7, Jaffe Decl. Ex. 1.) That long list allowed Waymo to begin a fishing expedition in hopes of finding something—anything—in Uber's LiDAR systems that might match one of their trade secrets. Waymo extensively investigated every aspect of Uber's LiDAR systems and knew the Stroz report was not yet produced, but made an informed choice to proceed with an October trial. Disappointed that the best it could find was the current nine trade secrets—all of which are easily shown to be without merit—Waymo now wants to go back to the drawing board by resurrecting its first list of trade secrets and apparently attempt to add even more.

It is obvious that Waymo cannot possibly try 120+ trade secrets at once. Such a trial would be unmanageable and take years. See AMEC Env't & Infrastructure, Inc. v. Geosyntec Consultants Inc., No. C 12-02973, 2013 WL 3923459, at \*3 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2013) (stating plaintiff's pursuit of several hundred trade secrets "implicates significant case management issues" and that a trial on so many trade secrets "likely would be unmanageable"). If a continuance is granted, Waymo will again have to narrow its list of trade secrets to proceed to trial, and when it does everybody involved will suffer from a serious case of déjà vu as we all DEFS. UBER TECHS., INC. & OTTOMOTTO LLC'S OPP'N TO WAYMO'S MOT. FOR CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL DATE

return to the present state of affairs—a short list of dubious trade secrets chosen only with the benefit of hindsight after yet another incredibly-burdensome fishing expedition. Granting the continuance will only serve to re-open discovery for another year or two, impose significant burdens on the parties and case management burdens on the Court, and likely push the parties further away from resolving their dispute.

## C. Equitable Bench Trial

Between these extremes, the Court could hold a short bench trial in October on the narrowed list of trade secrets and grant a continuance with regard to any others. On Saturday, Defendants filed a *Daubert* motion to exclude testimony from Michael Wagner, Waymo's damages expert. (Dkt. 1614-4.) Despite this Court's repeated warning not to be greedy, Waymo does exactly that—Mr. Wagner's report applies a model and assumptions that he neither created nor tested to "calculate" the future unjust profits that Uber supposedly will realize one day far in the future from a head start. That exercise resulted in absurd damages numbers, including a claim for a single trade secret. Even worse, Mr. Wagner's reasonable royalty analysis uses the future profits figure and then applies a across the board increase to arrive at a lump for that single trade secret. (Gonzalez Decl. Ex. 11 sum reasonable royalty up to ¶ 440.) Mr. Wagner's opinions are so unfounded and unreliable that the Court should reach the only possible conclusion—that Mr. Wagner must be excluded. Because Waymo has no other disclosed evidence of monetary damages, Waymo will be left only with a claim for injunctive relief that can be resolved through an equitable bench trial where the Court decides the scope of a permanent injunction, if any.

A bench trial now could be completed in less than half the time of the currently-scheduled trial given the Court's familiarity with the technology underlying the nine purported trade secrets, and could be limited to a discrete set of issues unaffected by the Stroz report. The Stroz report

does not address whether the nine trade secrets are valid trade secrets, does not address whether the asserted trade secrets are used in Uber's LiDAR systems, and does not address whether Uber independently developed the trade secrets. That is especially so where Waymo's motion for a continuance makes no mention of any additional information regarding the current nine trade secrets.

Not only would the bench trial not involve evidence of damages and the Stroz report, it also would not call for live testimony from Anthony Levandowski and many other fact witnesses because it would be primarily focused on technical issues. Finally, this trial would inform any settlement discussions and likely push the parties toward resolving the entire litigation, which would save the Court and the parties significant time and expense.

### VI. UBER REQUESTS A COURT-APPOINTED NEUTRAL EXPERT

If the Court is inclined to grant a continuance, a Court-appointed neutral expert is appropriate in this case, where the evidence is "confusing and conflicting" and an independent expert could "assist the court in evaluating contradictory evidence." *Walker v. Am. Home Shield Long Term Disability Plan*, 180 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 1999). In *McKinney*, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case and recommended that the district court consider appointing an expert because of the "complexity of the scientific evidence." *McKinney v. Anderson*, 924 F.2d 1500, 1511 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated on other grounds by *Helling v. McKinney*, 502 U.S. 903 (1991). The Federal Circuit, applying Ninth Circuit law, has upheld the appointment of an expert "where the district court was confronted by what it viewed as an unusually complex case and what appeared to be starkly conflicting expert testimony." *Monolithic Power Sys., Inc. v. O2 Micro Int'l Ltd.*, 558 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009). This Court, for example, has appointed a neutral expert where there are "extremely divergent views on damages" and given "the unusual complexity of the damages aspect of this case." *Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc.*, No. C 10-03561 WHA, 2015 WL 7429277, at \*1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2015).

This case is likewise complex, involves starkly conflicting expert testimony, and requires

the factfinder to evaluate confusing and contradictory evidence. Waymo's trade secrets have been and continue to be a moving target. (See Dkt. 426, PI Order at 21 ("it has become clear that Waymo has both overreached in defining its trade secrets and made moving targets out of its asserted trade secrets to evade defensive arguments".) For example, Waymo has retreated from claiming under TS 7 to claiming , or a range of . (Id. at 13; Dkt. 335-4 at 4.) In response to a Waymo email stating that " "Waymo's expert now opines that (Gonzalez Decl.

Ex. 12, WAYMO-UBER-00022196 at 22197; *Id.* Ex. 16, Hesselink Reply Rpt. ¶ 97.) In light of Waymo's repeated attempts to make moving targets out of its alleged trade secrets, a neutral expert would be valuable in helping the factfinders to understand the technical merits of the case.

Moreover, even now, the number of trade secrets Waymo will pursue remains uncertain, with the possibility remaining that Waymo will assert dozens more trade secret claims, many involving general principles and approaches in the field. (Mot. at 15-19 (seeking to add trade secrets; see also Dkt. 426, PI Order at 16 ("Waymo has overreached in attempting to claim ownership over general principles and approaches in the field."). A neutral expert would be valuable in assisting the factfinders with sorting through a large number of complex claims and understanding what is in the public domain.

Waymo argues against a neutral expert because the parties have already submitted reports from four different technical experts. (Mot. at 19.) The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument in Walker, where defendant contended that a neutral expert was unnecessary because "record was sufficiently developed." Walker, 180 F.3d at 1071. The Ninth Circuit found that the appointment was warranted, notwithstanding the existing record, because the evidence was "confusing and conflicting." *Id.* The same considerations apply here.

Waymo also argues that the appointment of a neutral expert will cause the jury to simply rely on the expert's opinions and result in a denial of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. (Mot. at 20-21.) This argument was rejected in the *Monolithic Power Systems* case that Waymo cites in its motion. In *Monolithic Power Systems*, the Federal Circuit found that:

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Ultimately, [defendant's] arguments that [the neutral expert's] 1 testimony relieved the jury of its tasks are policy arguments against Rule 706. However, Congress entertained and rejected these 2 arguments during the framing of Rule 706.... Furthermore, the 3 Supreme Court has long recognized the constitutionality of courtappointed experts." 4 Monolithic Power Sys., 558 F.3d at 1348 (citations omitted). The Monolithic Power Systems 5 court notes that the district court took care to instruct the jury that "it should not assign [the 6 expert's] opinion greater inherent weight on accord of his independent status," and the jury's 7 verdict did not track the expert's opinions. *Id.* at 1347. The same jury instruction can be 8 provided here to alleviate Waymo's concerns. 9 VII. **CONCLUSION** 10 Waymo insisted on an extremely expedited discovery schedule and made the knowing 11 strategic decision to proceed on the expedited schedule without having the Stroz report. The 12 parties have worked very hard to meet that schedule and to be ready for trial on nine trade secrets. 13 That plan should not be derailed. The Court should resolve Uber's motion in limine on damages 14 and try the nine trade secrets. 15 Dated: September 18, 2017 MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP 16 17 18 By: \_\_\_\_ /s/ Arturo J. González ARTURO J. GONZÁLEZ 19 Attorneys for Defendants 20 UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. and OTTOMOTTO LLC 2.1 22 23 24 25 26 27 28